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 eorge MacDonald’s life was permeated by a hyper-awareness of 
death, first through the early deaths of close family members and then through 
the tuberculosis which constantly threatened his life. Yet MacDonald did 
not live in fear of death, but in longing for it. In a letter to his wife in 1891, 
MacDonald writes in comfort about the death of their daughter Lilia, “Oh 
dear, what a mere inn of a place the world is! and thank God! we must widen 
and widen our thoughts and hearts. A great good is coming to us all—too 
big for this world to hold” (“G.M.D. to his Wife” 524). While death is to be 
desired for MacDonald, this longing is balanced with an equally strong sense 
of the wonder of this world. Objecting to an Evangelical religion which called 
for the rejection of the material world in order to win eternity, MacDonald 
wrote to his father:
          One of my greatest difficulties in consenting to think of religion 
          was that I thought I should have to give up my beautiful 
          thoughts and my love for the things God had made. But I find 
          that the happiness springing from all things not in themselves 
          sinful is much increased by religion. God is the God of the 
          beautiful, Religion the love of the Beautiful . . . . (“G.M.D. to 
          his Father” 108)
For MacDonald, both this world and the next are good, but this world is good 
because it points to God. Stephen Prickett and Frank Riga recognize in this 
attitude toward God and the physical world a Platonic idealism in which the 
physical world is the evanescent image which can lead us to the real in God. 
However, seeing MacDonald as a Platonist is problematic, which both Prickett 
and Riga acknowledge in using that label, one calling him a “temperamental 
Platonist” (Prickett, Victorian 170) and the other demonstrating the impurity 
of that Platonism (Riga 112), because it is contradictory for a Platonist to 
maintain the goodness of the material world while claiming its unreality. As 
David Robb observes, MacDonald “is opposed to materialism in all its forms, 
but his position is complicated by his seemingly opposite tendency to revel 
in the beauty and variety, the very evanescence, of the thing to be despised” 
(“Fiction” 38). By making this theoretical move, MacDonald abandons 
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locating the source of evil in the material world. But if evil is not in the 
illusory material world as Platonists hold, what is it and where is it? How can 
MacDonald maintain the goodness of this world while personally longing for 
death? 
 This theoretical problem does not point to a failure in MacDonald’s 
theology, for as Prickett observes, “Behind the magical beings of 
MacDonald’s universes lies the philosophical and theological principles 
of a scheme that is as carefully worked out as that of Dante” (“Two” 22). 
MacDonald’s failure to reject the material world by identifying it as evil is not 
merely a blip in his Platonism, but points to a different theology altogether. 
His fantasies written for adults, Phantastes and Lilith, the bookends of his 
writing career, outline the solution to the riddle of valuing both this world 
and the next. Instead of Platonism, MacDonald illustrates in these novels 
different facets of an Augustinian conception of the universe in which evil 
is the privation of good and all things with substance are good. Written 
at the beginning of his career and while he was a young man, Phantastes 
demonstrates the value and meaningfulness of the material world and subtly 
identifies the source of evil as the will of the self. His last major work, written 
during a time of increasing depression and declining health, Lilith, explores 
the workings of evil as it permeates the world. Ultimately, MacDonald 
exhibits a Platonism refracted through Augustine with an understanding of 
evil as the non-substantive privation of good, thereby allowing the celebration 
both of this life and the next one and laying the theoretical foundation for 
MacDonald’s belief in the future redemption of all people and all things. 
 British study of Augustine was rejuvenated in 1838 when Edward 
Pusey published a widely available revised translation of Augustine’s The 
Confessions (Cobb). MacDonald’s academic and religious training ensures his 
familiarity with this text and the theology behind it. In The Confessions and 
his Christian writings, Augustine, inheriting Platonism through Plotinus, posits 
an idealistic universe structured as a continuum with God, as the Supreme 
Good and That Which Is, at the top and the created world at the bottom. God, 
for Augustine, is the Real, the Good, and the Ultimate Substance. Everything 
else in the world has substance (which is not synonymous with material) in 
a lesser degree. Because God is good and he created all things, nothing he 
created can be evil. In The Confessions, Augustine claims that “therefore 
whatsoever is, is good. That evil then which I sought, whence it is, is not any 
substance: for were it a substance, it should be good” (122). Corroboratively, 
in The City of God, Augustine observes that “evil has no positive nature; the 
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loss of good has received the name ‘evil’” (354). While the Platonic hierarchy 
puts the evil material at the bottom and the good ideal at the top, Augustinian 
cosmology affirms the goodness and reality of all substances along a 
continuum which ascends from good but less substance to even better, more 
real substance, finally terminating in That Which Is. For Augustine, no part of 
this continuum is in itself bad or evil.
 Before his conversion to Christianity, Augustine studied for several 
years with the Manicheans, who maintained a strict, antagonistic dualism 
between the evil material world and the good spiritual world. Yet Augustine 
struggled with this explanation for the existence of evil because it implies 
that God created evil. After leaving the Manichees because of their failure 
to expound a satisfying explanation for evil, Augustine formulated the idea 
that evil is merely the privation of good and therefore has no substance, since 
all substance is good through its creation by a good God. This facilitated 
a new attitude toward the material world. Encouraged by the Platonists to 
“search for incorporeal truth,” Augustine began to see God’s “invisible things, 
understood by those things which are made” (Confessions 126). According 
to the Platonists, the seeker begins on the lowest rung of the hierarchy, the 
created world, and then proceeds upward, abandoning the previous rung 
with the implication that the lowest rung, although necessary, is evil. Instead, 
Augustine claims the inherent goodness of even the distant points on the 
continuum because they are created by God. In The City of God, he asserts 
that “all natures, then, inasmuch as they are, and have therefore a rank and 
species of their own, and a kind of internal harmony, are certainly good” 
(384). This attempt to understand God through the created world coupled 
with an assertion of the goodness of all substance is impossible with the 
Manicheans and sets Augustine apart from Platonic idealism. Because the 
natural world is good, Augustine, unlike the Platonists, can embrace it fully 
and classify evil as the privation of good.
 For Augustine, the theoretical challenge was how evil is introduced 
into the world if all things are good. Augustine suggests that when the will 
abandons what is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil—not 
because that is evil to which it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. 
Therefore it is not an inferior thing which has made the will evil, but it is itself 
which has become so by wickedly and inordinately desiring an inferior thing. 
(City 386)
 He adds that “defection from that supremely is, to that which has less 
of being—this is to begin to have an evil will” (387). In The Confessions, 
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Augustine explains how evil works within the individual: “when I did will or 
nill any thing, I was most sure, that no other than myself did will and nill: and 
I all but saw that there was the cause of my sin” (110). To have an evil will is 
to have disordered desires. This implies that all things that can be desired have 
intrinsic value, but that some things have more value than others, and should 
be desired accordingly. 
 Instead of locating evil outside of the person by blaming it on some 
evil force in the universe as the Manichees did, Augustine conceives of the 
traditional Devil and his fallen angels as individual examples of the entrance 
of evil into an individual existence. He explains: “If we ask the cause of the 
misery of the bad [angels], it occurs to us, and not unreasonably, that they are 
miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned 
toward themselves who have no such essence” (City 385). He continues 
about the nature of angels, “whilst by abandoning Him it should become, not 
indeed no nature at all, but a nature with a less ample existence, and therefore 
wretched” (385). To do evil is not to choose the material over the physical as 
the Manichees would suggest, but is to turn away from God and toward the 
self, something that is good but is less good than God, causing a disordering 
of the desires.
 MacDonald’s Phantastes, the story of a young man who unknowingly 
“set out to find [his] Ideal” (184), reveals a Platonic idealism in the conception 
of physical things as images of transcendent ideals which a person should 
seek to understand. Mirroring the experience in Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave” 
from The Republic, Anodos is completely unaware of the existence of the 
ideal, the goal of life, when he enters fairyland, an ignorance betrayed in his 
constant bewilderment and aimless wandering. However, when he sees the 
lady imprisoned in the marble, the existence of the ideal flashes upon him. 
Awed by her, he notes: “What I did see appeared to me perfectly lovely; more 
near the face that had been born with me in my soul, than anything I had seen 
before in nature or art” (36). Anodos becomes aware of an ideal for which he 
yearns and which is beyond the luminous surface of the material marble. This 
idealism also permeates Anodos’s reading in the Fairy Palace, where he “was 
trying to find the root of a manifestation, the spiritual truth whence a material 
vision sprang” (75-76). Elaborating the process of this reading, Anodos notes 
that the fairy book “glowed and flashed the thoughts upon the soul, with such 
a power that the medium disappeared from the consciousness, and it was 
occupied only with the things themselves” (84). Through his reading, Anodos 
almost achieves a Platonic ecstasy in which he perceives the things as they 
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are, bypassing the material of the book which he reads. Anodos’s journey, 
like that in Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave,” is a gradual realization of the ideal 
which grounds the existence of material objects.
 Yet the idealism of Anodos is not wholly Platonic because it does not 
reject and devalue the physical, particular embodiment of the ideal after it has 
been used as a tool for contemplating that ideal. When Anodos finally catches 
up to the White Lady in the evening dance at the Fairy Palace, his singing her 
into a fully sensuous life is a positive, not negative, achievement. As he sings, 
“a real woman-soul was revealing itself by successive stages of imbodiment 
[sic], and consequent manifestation and expression” (112). Hers is the “face 
that had been born with [him] in [his] soul” (36), the ideal which he pursues. 
Yet the celebration of her embodiment suggests that knowing the ideal 
intellectually is somehow dissatisfying and that an embodiment of the ideal 
in beautiful material is preferable. This breaks with Platonic idealism and 
the accompanying dualism which suggests that the spiritual is always better 
than the material. Instead, material objects formed from the ideal are to be 
celebrated in themselves. Frank Riga understands this process by suggesting 
that MacDonald demonstrates an impure Platonism which “accommodated the 
essential goodness of the flesh and its ultimate purification and resurrection” 
(112). But instead of merely an impure Platonism, MacDonald brilliantly 
illustrates an Augustinian understanding of the universe in which all things 
possessing substance are inherently good because created by a good God.
 Phantastes celebrates the entire natural world, pointing toward an 
Augustinian understanding of the goodness of the universe as created by God. 
Like Augustine’s confrontation with the Manichees over their dichotomy 
between evil material and good spiritual powers in the universe, MacDonald 
faced religious people, especially in the growing Evangelical sect, who 
believed that the material world was evil and the spiritual world was good. 
In Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre, Mr. Brocklehurst exemplifies this Victorian 
Manichean phenomenon: he mortifies the flesh to improve the soul. He 
chastises the headmistress for feeding the girls bread and cheese instead of 
burnt porridge and he even requires the cutting of the girls’ hair when he 
thinks long hair will cause the lust of the flesh (53-54). While MacDonald 
is in “unrelenting opposition to the materialism of the modern outlook” 
(Robb MacDonald 23), MacDonald, in Phantastes, holds what Rolland Hein 
suggests is a sacramental view of nature (65-66), in which he proclaims the 
religious power of nature, redeeming the beauty of the physical, material 
world from Evangelicals who brand it as evil. In Anodos’s reading in the 
20   Salvey
Fairy Library, he discovers that “All that man sees has to do with man. Worlds 
cannot be without an intermundane relationship. The community of the centre 
of all creation suggests an interradiating connection and dependence of the 
parts” (77). The natural world is not evil, but is interrelated with the spiritual; 
the poles of binary dualism are brought together in the “community of the 
centre.” 
 The lavish descriptions of the natural world through which Anodos 
travels reveal MacDonald’s appreciation of the created order. The very 
beginning of Anodos’s adventure celebrates the beauty of the natural world 
which invades Anodos’s bedroom:
           where this carpet, which I had myself designed to imitate a 
          field of grass and daisies, bordered the course of the little 
          stream, the grass-blades and daisies seemed to wave in a tiny 
          breeze that followed the water’s flow; while under the rivulet 
          they bent and swayed with every motion of the changeful 
          current, as if they were about to dissolve in it, and, forsaking 
          their fixed form become fluent as the waters. (9)
Not merely a method of discovering ideals, the natural world is inherently 
valuable. Later Anodos sleeps in the arms of the earth where “glow-worm 
was alight here and there, burning out into the great universe. The night-hawk 
heightened all the harmony and stillness with his oft-recurring, discordant jar” 
(42). MacDonald portrays the earth as loving and lovely, its beauty a gift from 
God. Cutting between a Romantic idolization of nature and a Platonic disdain 
for the material, MacDonald manifests an Augustinian understanding of the 
created world as inherently good because created by God and as usefully good 
for man because through it he can think God’s thoughts after him.
 In opposition to Victorian Manichees, Phantastes illustrates that 
evil is not within the natural world but corrupts it, a parasite on anything 
with substance, including the psyche. While evil characters scurry through 
the fantastic landscape, MacDonald never presents the Devil as the ultimate 
source of all evil, an impulse consistent with Augustinian evil. Evil has no 
single source in the universe from which it emanates (which would be a 
reverse structure of the good). Instead, MacDonald presents evil as a shadow 
over the self, locating evil within the self. Although the shadow which Anodos 
acquires at the cottage of the Ogress has been defined in many different ways, 
a diversity of interpretation which bothers David Robb (MacDonald 84), the 
shadow in each definition is something sinister, something evil: it is a negation 
of good. The source of Anodos’s shadow points to its definition as evil. When 
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Anodos enters the cottage of the Ogress, she is reading:
          “So, then, as darkness had no beginning, neither will it 
          ever have an end. So, then, it is eternal. The negation of aught 
          else, is its affirmation. Where the light cannot come, there  
                 abideth darkness. The light doth but hollow a mine out of the 
          infinite extension of darkness. And ever upon the steps of light 
          treadeth the darkness; yea, springeth in fountains and wells 
          amidst it, from the secret channels of its mighty sea. Truly, man 
          is but a passing flame, moving unquietly amid the surrounding 
          rest of night; without which he yet could not be, and whereof he 
          is in part compounded.” (55-56)
This strange speech discusses the source of darkness, associated with evil 
in Christian imagery. The Ogress asserts the substance of darkness, of evil, 
and suggests that man’s existence is grounded in the darkness. Yet the fact 
that she is an Ogress implies that she is somehow evil so her words must be 
taken not as MacDonald’s own view, but as the opposite of it. Inverted, this 
speech outlines the Augustinian conception of substance and goodness (light). 
Darkness and light are in opposition, but light is substance and darkness is 
the absence of substance. Darkness, or evil, has no beginning or end, it is not 
eternal but rather non-existent. The Ogress inverts the Platonic Cave paradigm 
(in which a cave, or mine, is dug out of the “infinite extension” of lightness) 
by suggesting that the light dug a mine out of the substance of darkness. 
Yet even in her falsity, she does not set up an evil ideal around which this 
dark world is centered. Although the inversion and falsity of her speech is 
confusing, her chant points toward the meaning of evil as the absence of good. 
 Anodos’s acquisition of the shadow illustrates MacDonald’s 
Augustinian conception of evil and the self. Unfortunately for Anodos, his 
perverse impulse, his disordered desire, motivates him to open the door of 
the closet, of the inverted Platonic Cave, out of which his shadow, evil, finds 
him. After he sees a figure travelling towards him, he “looked round over [his] 
shoulder; and there, on the ground, lay a black shadow, the size of a man. It 
was so dark, that [he] could see it in the dim light of the lamp, which shone 
full upon it, apparently without thinning at all the intensity of its hue” (57). 
The shadow has no independent existence, does not have its own substance, 
but is the negation of light, of good. It lives as a parasite on the self of 
Anodos. After gaining the shadow in the “Church of Darkness” (69), Anodos’s 
vision of the world is distorted by it. When he sees a child with a magical 
toy, “straightway he was a common place boy” (60) when the shadow affects 
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him. Anodos visits a town where if he gets too close to people they appear 
terrifically ugly when the shadow falls upon them (63). Eventually his self and 
his shadow are tangled up together, and he cries, when at the Fairy Palace: 
“‘Shadow of me!’ I said, ‘which art not me, but which representest thyself 
to me as me; here I may find a shadow of light which will devour thee, the 
shadow of darkness!’” (72). Yet there is no evidence or implication that the 
shadow has a self or a substance separate from Anodos—the shadow was “in 
[his] heart as well as at [his] heels” (64). Anodos’s loss of the shadow reveals 
the relationship of self and evil. He says, 
          Then first I knew the delight of being lowly; of saying to myself, 
          “I am what I am, nothing more.” “I have failed,” I said, “I have 
          lost my self—would it had been my shadow.” I looked round: 
          the shadow was nowhere to be seen. Ere long, I learned that it 
          was not myself, but only my shadow, that I had lost. . . . Indeed, 
          my ideal soon became my life; whereas, formerly, my life had 
          consisted in a vain attempt to behold, if not my ideal in myself, 
          at least myself in my ideal. (166)
When Anodos focuses on himself, when he ignores the advice given to him 
by others, the shadow begins its terrorization of him when it comes from 
the depth of the darkness. In that shadowed state, Anodos no longer tries to 
seek the ideal, but only seeks to serve himself. This turning to self instead 
of looking toward God, the true ideal, is what Augustine pinpoints as the 
invasion of evil into the self. All the things which the self-centered try to 
achieve are good in themselves, but have been distorted by the disordered 
desires of an evil will which turns to the self, the lower good, rather than 
focusing on That Which Is, on God. Anodos escapes evil when he turns away 
from himself and toward the true ideal, making his journey a working through 
of what Max Keith Sutton calls the “disorders of a narcissistic personality” 
(13). 
 Yet the novel does not end merely on Anodos’s ecstatic loss of self in 
ever-increasing union with God. Instead Anodos must return, after he learns 
these lessons about self, evil, and the ideal, to the regular, non-fantasy, earthly 
world. In fairyland, Anodos dies and achieves union with and knowledge of 
the ideal. So when he awakens on the top of an earthly hill, he feels that he 
is “sinking from such a state of ideal bliss, into a world of shadows” (182). 
Like Plato’s philosopher-king, he must descend back into the world of images 
in order to lead the people. Yet this is not a true Platonism which disparages 
the natural world, but a cosmology which values the natural world as good, 
Riddled with Evil   23
but just not as good, not as real, as the world which Anodos has recently left. 
Wondering about what he has learned in fairyland, Anodos asks whether he is 
a “ghost, sent into the world to minister to [his] fellowmen, or, rather, to repair 
the wrongs [he] had already done” (184). Anodos’s sorrow in returning to this 
world is not that this world is evil, but that it does not have the full reality 
which imbued fairyland. This earthly world is not evil, but because it is not as 
real, it is not as good.  
 Finally, the book ends with Anodos speaking with a tone of 
confidence: “Yet I know that good is coming to me—that good is always 
coming; though few have at all times the simplicity and the courage to believe 
it. What we call evil, is the only and best shape, which, for the person and his 
condition at the time, could be assumed by the best good” (185). For Anodos, 
evil has no independent existence. Instead, good is always coming because the 
entirely good world is ever in a movement of tighter and tighter spirals toward 
the perfection of the “community of the centre,” of the top of the hierarchy 
or the center of the bulls’ eye: the Supreme Good, the Augustinian God at the 
center of the universe, out of whom all of the Platonic ideas spring and then 
are clothed with good substance to form the good natural world. 
 The conception of good and evil illustrated by Phantastes is an 
implicit version of Augustine’s Plato-informed conception of the universe and 
of evil. By asserting the value and goodness of the material world through 
articulation of evil as something which cuts across the material and spiritual 
as the privation of good, MacDonald rescues material life and makes it 
meaningful while also celebrating the life which is to come. Yet the novel, 
because it is almost completely centered around Anodos and his psyche, does 
not contain a full elaboration of how evil functions in the world at large. 
MacDonald’s late novel, Lilith, contains MacDonald’s clearer theodicy, his 
explanation of evil in the universe. In this bitter and weird novel, MacDonald 
exposes the functioning of evil and illustrates its corruption of the self and its 
social impact, while still maintaining the goodness of a world shadowed by 
evil. 
 From the beginning of the novel, Lilith presents, through Vane’s 
journey of upward movement, an Augustinian understanding of the universe 
as a continuum culminating in ultimate good and of humanity’s status in 
that continuum. Vane’s ancestor is identified as a Sir Upward who suddenly 
disappeared and was never heard from again (9), implying that he moved 
“Upward” on the continuum. In the second chapter of the novel, Vane begins 
this upward journey by following Mr. Raven up the stairs into the garret 
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where a new world is revealed to him through a magical mirror. Paralleling 
the Platonic “Allegory of the Cave,” Vane turns away from the attractive 
world he sees out of his window and climbs the stairs to the attic and into 
knowledge of another world.  Vane’s movement from regular earthly reality 
into the fairy world is conceptualized as an unwilling upward movement as 
the magnetism of Mr. Raven compels him toward a fuller understanding of 
the universe. Once in fairyland, Vane continues the upward journey through 
this higher plane. Mr. Raven attempts to communicate this multi-level 
conception of reality when he tells Vane that they are “‘[i]n the region of the 
seven dimensions’” (21) which interpenetrate, but that the immature Vane can 
only see the three regular dimensions.1 As Mr. Raven is “‘widening [Vane’s] 
horizon’” (22), Vane begins to grasp that there are more levels to reality than 
he comprehends. In an Augustinian fashion, Vane’s passage will be through 
those levels as he “journeys spiritually toward oneness with God,” as Rolland 
Hein labels it (91). 
 Although often a strange and menacing landscape, the natural world 
in Lilith is affirmed instead of debased. Mr. Raven tells Vane, “‘All live things 
were thoughts to begin with, and are fit therefore to be used by those that 
think. When one says to the great Thinker:—‘Here is one of thy thoughts: 
I am thinking it now!’ that is a prayer—a word to the big heart from one 
of its own little hearts’” (26). Platonically, the natural world is the flimsy 
embodiment of an ideal to be discarded when its utility ends; but this passage 
celebrates the natural thing as a way to understand God and his creation. 
When Vane returns to his library after his second trip to fairyland, he ponders, 
“Which was the real—what I now saw, or what I had just ceased to see? Could 
both be real, interpenetrating yet unmingling?” (37). The different worlds, 
“interpenetrating yet unmingling,” are both real and are intimately knitted 
together. However, as David Robb points out, “the world into which Vane 
stumbles has an additional quality of being there” (MacDonald 97). It exists 
on a higher rung of the continuum of reality, where substance and goodness 
increase as a thing approaches the terminal end of that continuum, That Which 
Is. Although fairyland seems to be a on a higher rung of the Augustinian 
universal hierarchy, the reality of the earthly world is not negated. Both 
worlds are real, although possibly not equally real, and both worlds are good, 
although perhaps not equally good.
 Instead of identifying evil as something material, MacDonald 
illustrates the character of evil through the Shadow, an absence of light, a 
parasite upon substance, which oppresses Bulika and is especially powerful 
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around Lilith. Entering Bulika, Vane sees the Shadow, the symbol of ultimate 
evil, in the street:
          At a place where he had to cross a patch of moonlight, I saw 
          that he cast no shadow, and was himself but a flat superficial 
          shadow, of two dimensions. He was, nevertheless, an opaque 
          shadow, for he not merely darkened any object on the other 
          side of him, but rendered it, in fact, invisible. In the shadow 
          he was blacker than the shadow; in the moonlight he looked like 
          one who had drawn his shadow up about him, for not a 
          suspicion of it moved beside or under him . . . . When they 
          passed together from the shadow into the moonlight, the Shadow 
          deepened into blackness. (118-119) 
As a symbol, the shadow is often employed to express something which has 
existence but no substance because it is the negation of light. Shadows are 
the darkness, the privation of light, as Augustinian evil is merely the non-
substantial privation of good. MacDonald builds on this conception, but, 
because the Shadow is a being, he has a small amount of substance. The 
Shadow, as the “Prince of the Power of the Air” (75), has turned away from 
good for so long that his existence has almost dwindled to nothingness—a 
flat, two dimensional shape which has “‘no thick to him’” (187). MacDonald’s 
Augustinian sense of evil as that which has no substance but is a negation of 
good is darkly expressed in the haunting persona of the Shadow. 
 Yet the responsibility for sin and evil in the novel does not lie with 
some independent evil force in the world, but is bound up in the choices of the 
self. Augustine explains specifically that selves generate evil when they “have 
forsaken Him who supremely is, and have turned to themselves who have no 
such essence” (City 385). Vane’s journeys illustrate this disparity between the 
real self grounded on “him who supremely is” and the evil self which attempts 
to form its own identity. Entering fairyland, Vane realizes that he does not 
know who he is: “Then I understood that I did not know myself, did not know 
what I was, had no grounds on which to determine that I was one and not 
another” (Lilith 14). Something outside of himself is required for existence; if 
he turns to himself to define himself, his identity disappears. In Vane’s second 
excursion to fairyland, Mr. Raven tells Vane that Vane is “‘but beginning to 
become an individual’” (21), as he, like Anodos, works toward overcoming 
narcissism. Wandering through the Evil Wood, Vane also recognizes that 
self-focus, a turning to the self and away from God, constitutes hell: “What a 
hell of horror . . . to wander alone, a bare existence never going out of itself, 
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never widening its life in another life, but, bound with the cords of its poor 
peculiarities, lying an eternal prisoner in the dungeon of its own being! . . . 
evil was only through good! selfishness but a parasite on the tree of life” (83). 
As Colin Manlove observes, the self of the ego is the source of evil in Lilith 
(60). Essentially, hell and evil have no positive existence; they are a lack of 
supreme good caused by self-focus.
 Continuing to illustrate the workings of evil in the world, MacDonald 
dramatizes through Vane’s relationship with the Little Ones that evil is not 
antecedent to substance but is merely caused by a choice of something that 
is less good than should have been chosen. When Mr. Raven warns Vane to 
refuse to complete a task which has been requested by a deceiver and Vane 
asks what will happen if he does, Raven answers, “‘then some evil that is 
good for you will follow’” (95). Evil does not exist in the thing itself, but in 
the relationship of that thing to the Good. Originally, Vane decides not to risk 
educating the Little Ones because he is unsure about the benefit for them. 
This impulse to protect them is not inherently evil, but it is just not as good as 
educating them, as Mr. Raven points out to Vane much later in the story (142). 
The evil is in choosing to do the less good thing. Evil does not attack the self 
from outside, but from within. Vane again makes this mistake through his 
selfishness, when he proudly believes that he knows better than Adam when 
Adam invites him to lie down in death before any attempted rescue of the 
Little Ones. Instead of dying and then going to rescue the Little Ones, Vane 
sets off before his death to educate and save them. The result is the tragic (to 
Vane) death of Lona and the near-defeat of the Little Ones. Vane’s affectionate 
yet misguided relationship to the Little Ones reveals how evil is a parasite on 
goodness picked up through self-focus. 
 Like Augustine, MacDonald enters deeply into the exploration of the 
nature of evil through the consideration of a fallen angel, Lilith. According to 
Augustine, angels are naturally good because they are beings created by God. 
The fallen angels, however, “have forsaken Him who supremely is, and have 
turned to themselves who have no such essence” (City 385), which constitutes 
evil and entry into the hell of the self. Through the Kabbalistic fallen angel, 
MacDonald illustrates the complete process of creation, fall, and redemption, 
but focuses in the majority of the novel on the corrupted Lilith, on the time 
between fall and redemption. Using Lilith to represent that element of society 
which is evil as Kath Filmer suggests, MacDonald seeks to address the 
“existence” and eventual end of evil in the universe. Of her creation, Adam 
recounts the story of God’s gift of Lilith to him:
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          He brought me an angelic splendor to be my wife: there she lies! 
          For her first thought was power; she counted it slavery to be one 
          with me, and bear children for Him who gave her being. . . . 
          Finding, however, that I would but love and honour, never obey 
          and worship her, she poured out her blood to escape me, fled to 
          the army of the aliens and soon had so ensnared the heart of the 
          great Shadow that he became her slave, wrought her will, and 
          made her queen of Hell. (147-148) 
Because a good God created all things and Lilith is part of created substance, 
Lilith herself was also created good. But she lost that complete goodness when 
she turned to herself for her identity, refusing to submit to Adam and the God 
for which Adam was the earthly representative. Instead she sets up herself as 
God, as the source of herself, demanding worship from Adam. 
 The evil and corruption of Lilith are represented on the surface of her 
body by the presence of the shadowy wound, the abscess, which is slowly 
destroying her by dissolving her substance as it corrupts her body. On Vane’s 
first encounter with Lilith, he notices the presence of the spot. He describes 
the figure he sees: “The eyes in the beautiful face were dead, and on her left 
side was a dark spot, against which she would now and then press her hand” 
(50). After the white leopardess, the symbol of uncorrupted good, defeats the 
spotted leopardess, “the spotted one drew herself away, and rose on her hind 
legs. Erect in the moonlight stood the princess, a confused rush of shadows 
careering over her whiteness” (135). When Adam discovers that Lilith has 
followed Vane into the earthly world, she claims that she is beautiful and that 
the spots have disappeared, but Adam challenges her “‘what is that under 
thy right hand?’” (149). Obedient yet fiercely reluctant, she reveals the spot 
and Adam says, “‘It is not on the leopard; it is in the woman! . . . Nor will it 
leave thee until it hath eaten to thy heart, and thy beauty hath flowed from 
thee through the open wound’” (149). Yet he beseeches her to “‘repent, and be 
again an angel of God’” (149). When Vane, seduced by her beauty, is tempted 
to help her, Adam explains, “‘Nothing will ever close that wound . . . . It must 
eat into her heart! Annihilation itself is no death to evil. Only good where 
evil was, is evil dead. An evil thing must live with its evil until it chooses to 
be good. That alone is the slaying of evil” (153). Adam’s explanation of the 
wound reveals that evil and annihilation are synonymous because they are 
the decay and negation of substance, while good is the return, the completion 
of substance. Evil can neither die nor be killed because it has no substance; 
instead, it must be replaced by good. Therefore, death in annihilation is only 
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more evil. The abscess on Lilith’s body represents the nothingness, the evil, 
eating into Lilith’s body and soul. Life, and the healing of the wound, can only 
come through turning to the Good, whose presence will nullify the absence 
(the abscess), which is evil. 
 Yet even in this despicable character, evil is not her essence but 
attacks that essence. Lilith’s night in Mara’s cottage demonstrates that Lilith’s 
evilness is not part of her substance, but is caused by turning toward herself, 
refusing to orient herself toward God. Mara asks Lilith, “‘Will you turn away 
from the wicked things you have been doing so long?’” (199) and Lilith 
replies, “‘I will not . . . . I will be myself and not another!’” (199), eliding 
the self and evil and revealing that the evil person turns toward the self and 
refuses the upward journey. Mara replies, “‘Alas, you are another now, not 
yourself! Will you not be your real self?’” (199). The “real self” is not found 
through focus on the self, but through turning to the Good and locating the self 
in relationship to it. Lilith proclaims to Mara that freed from Mara’s cottage 
          “I will do as my Self pleases—as my Self desires.”
          “You will do as the Shadow, overshadowing your Self inclines 
          you?” (199)
Although Lilith perceives her nature through herself, Mara knows that Lilith’s 
inherently good nature is distorted by the shadow of turning toward herself 
instead of the good. Holding tightly to the self, although it is her hell, Lilith 
rebuffs Mara’s comment that that Self is an illusion:
          “What I choose to seem to myself makes me what I am. My own 
          thought makes me me; my own thought of myself is me. 
          Another shall not make me!”
  “But another has made you, and can compel you to see what 
          you have made yourself.” (200)
If the created world is the embodiment of God’s thoughts, then Lilith attempts 
to usurp the position of God when she claims that “my own thought makes 
me me,” instead of merely trying to think God’s thoughts after him. Lilith 
sets herself up as her own creator and the center of her universe, revealing her 
turning away from God and toward herself. 
 Even this sinister personality is redeemed at the end of the novel, 
though, further illustrating MacDonald’s universalism. As a creation of God, 
Lilith still retains her inherent goodness, facilitating her final salvation. Only 
her will is evil, not her substance. Still in Mara’s cottage, Mara tells Lilith 
how she will be redeemed:
          “There is a light that goes much deeper than the will, a light that 
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          lights up the darkness behind it: that light can change your will, 
          can make it truly yours and not another’s—not the Shadow’s. 
          Into the created can pour itself the creating will, and so redeem 
          it!” (200)
Despite her evil, Lilith can be redeemed when she is set again in proper 
relationship to the hierarchy of the universe. The light which is coming to 
Lilith will destroy the shadow and will change Lilith’s narcissistic volition. 
Only by turning that will and contemplation away from the self will Lilith 
ever achieve her “real self” (199). When the “creating will,” the ideal thought 
of God, enters Lilith, she will be redeemed and made more real. After this 
conversation, the “worm-thing . . . white-hot, vivid as incandescent silver, 
the live heart of essential fire” crawls into Lilith’s abscess and reveals herself 
to her, placing her in the “‘hell of her self-consciousness’” (201), while 
beginning the restoration of her body and her soul.
 Yet Lilith’s resistance, MacDonald’s testament to the stubbornness 
of the human spirit, to the coming of that light, leads her to the edge of 
annihilation, the edge of complete evil through dissolution of substance. After 
she has seen herself through the light of God, she still refuses to turn away 
from herself, to “‘restore that which [she has] wrongfully taken’” (203). Her 
refusal to turn toward God leads her to the brink of annihilation. Watching her, 
Vane notices
          an invisible darkness, a something more terrible than aught that 
          had yet made itself felt. A horrible Nothingness, a Negation 
          positive, infolded her; the border of its being that was yet no 
          being, touched me, and for one ghastly instant I seemed alone 
          with Death Absolute! It was not the absence of everything I felt, 
          but the presence of Nothing. . . . It was the recoil of Being from 
          Annihilation. (204)
The culmination of her turning away from God and towards herself is 
“horrible Nothingness, Negation positive” resulting in utter “Annihilation.” 
The more evil she is, the less real she becomes. Ultimately, if she chooses 
to continue to turn toward the self, that self will be completely destroyed in 
Annihilation, in Death Absolute, which is the end of being altogether, the 
absence of the good substance which God created. Yet because she has some 
being, some goodness, left in her, she rejects Annihilation. 
 After this brush with Annihilation, Lilith waveringly begins the 
upward process of the right relationship to God only to fall even lower. 
Knowing “the one that God had intended her to be, the other that she had 
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made herself” (204), she neither wants to be what she has made herself nor 
does she want to turn her will toward God. Lilith’s defiance returns strongly 
and she undergoes the “most fearful thing of all. . . . Life in Death—life 
dead, yet existent” (205). When she is in this state, Vane realizes that in her 
self-centeredness and self-absorption she is truly the “queen of Hell” (206). 
He notes that “the source of life had withdrawn itself; all that was left her 
of conscious being was the dregs of her dead and corrupted life” (206) and 
that she was now “what God could not have created” (206). All that remains 
is the self willed by Lilith—a self without life or goodness because severed 
from God, the “source of life.” Through this agony, Lilith finally turns toward 
God after he has left her, by trying to open her hand (207). Her turning away 
from herself is represented in the tears that she sheds, beginning to release the 
waters that she had pulled into herself in her selfishness. 
 Yet even in her repentance Lilith believes she is ending her suffering 
through some kind of catatonic, ignorant existence away from God, the center 
of the universe. Although she has already experienced this kind of death in 
her experience of Annihilation, she tells Adam that “’I cried out for Death—to 
escape Him and thee!’” (214). But this understanding of death as a cessation, 
that death cannot be good in any way, is false. Instead, as Adam says to Lilith, 
“Cease thou canst not: wilt thou not be restored and be?’” (214). To die in 
the right sense is to be more fully than the person has ever been. To turn 
away from self in dying is to attain a higher level of existence as the person 
moves closer to God. For MacDonald, death is not an escape from the earthly 
physical world but a completion of it through an increase of substance.
 Vane’s eventual death cements the goodness of MacDonald’s 
conception of death as not some kind of evil annihilation but as a fulfillment 
and expansion of good life. When Vane awakes, he sees Lona waiting for 
him. He notes that “she fell asleep a girl; she awoke a woman, ripe with 
the loveliness of the life essential” (238). Through her death, Lona, instead 
of deteriorating, increases in reality and, because of that, she increases in 
loveliness as she progresses in her upward journey toward God. After his 
waking, he also meets Adam who tells him that “‘you have died into life, 
and will die no more; you have only to keep dead. . . . Now you have only 
to live, and that you must, with all your blessed might. The more you live, 
the stronger you become to live’” (238). In his upward journey, Vane will 
continue to gain reality as he lives strongly with ever-increasing strength. Eve 
tells him that 
          “the Life keeps generating ours.—Those who will not die, die 
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          many times, die constantly, keep dying deeper, never have done 
          dying; here all is upwardness and love and gladness.” (239)
This life-after-death, this life-in-death, is characterized by “upwardness,” as 
the person moves closer and closer to “The Life” which gives him existence. 
The remainder of Vane’s life in the fantastic dreamland is his joyful journey 
to heaven, the “Journey Home” (243), where “it had ceased to be dark” and 
“nothing cast a shadow, all things interchanged a little light” (243). Here 
“every growing thing showed [him], by its shape and colour, its indwelling 
idea—the informing thought, that is, which was its being, and sent it out” 
(243). Because things are closer to the Thinker, they are more real by emitting 
more clearly the idea which is behind them. But he recognizes that “something 
more than the sun, greater than the light, is coming, is coming . . . . He is 
coming, is coming” (245). Vane wanders through the wonderful heaven with 
Lona, marveling at its beauty and reality and longing to meet him whose 
“substance and radiance were human” (248). 
 The great joy in Vane’s death-into-life is not limited only to himself, 
but will be shared by everything in existence, including the Shadow. Even the 
Shadow himself, because he has that tiny two-dimensional scrap of substance, 
will eventually enter the house of death and begin the upward journey toward 
life. Eve tells Lilith that the only way the Shadow will enter the house of 
the dead is to “‘lie down and sleep also—His hour will come, and he knows 
it will’” (218). The negation of good, the Shadow who has almost lost his 
existence because of that evil, will eventually die into life, substance, and 
move toward the Good. Once everything is caught in the net of the good 
death, it will move toward God, toward the real. Augustinian theology and 
cosmology explain why the Shadow, the Devil, can be redeemed through his 
turning away from himself and towards God. The ultimate redemption of the 
Shadow reveals the strength of MacDonald’s universalism, a universalism 
built on the Augustinian conception of evil as the privation of good balanced 
with the belief in the value of the physical world as part of the good substance 
of God’s creation.
 In the final pages of the novel, Vane, like Anodos does in Phantastes, 
returns to the real world, to his library, where he takes up the journey again. 
Yet despite his longing to be with Lona, he willingly remains in this world, 
saying that “‘all the days of my appointed time will I wait till my change 
come’” (251). He looks at the created things around him and sometimes, when 
he looks “they seem to waver as if a wind rippled their solid mass, and another 
world were about to break through” (251). Within the Platonic context, the 
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good of the other world implies the evil of this world. However, within the 
text’s Augustinian conception of the good of the created world and of evil 
as the privation of good, this idealism allows a celebration both of the world 
at which Vane looks and the world which almost breaks through the earthly 
screen. Through the Augustinian conception of evil and the goodness of the 
universe, Phantastes and Lilith point to a reconciliation of materialism and 
idealism, the kind of breakdown of binaries which MacDonald celebrated. 
Despite MacDonald’s increased focus on evil in Lilith, he continues to 
affirm the goodness of this world presented in Phantastes, while he longs 
for the imminent death of an old man. Ultimately, Lilith is not a riddle as 
Robb suggests (MacDonald 97), but is itself a solution to the paradox of 
MacDonald’s personal belief in the goodness of the world and his longing for 
death. 
Endnote
1. Deirdre Hayward argues that the “Seven-fold Pattern of Existence” theology is 
taken directly from the German mystic Jacob Boehme. In Boehme’s theology, man 
goes through seven specific levels, which exist within himself, before he achieves 
oneness with God.
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